

Message Text

SECRET

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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

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E.O. 11652:XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: PLENARY MEETING, FEB 27, 1978

CTB MESSAGE NO. 153

1. SUMMARY. AT RESTRICTED PLENARY AND HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON FEB 27, MOROKHOV REVIEWED WHERE HE BELIEVED THE NEGOTIATIONS STOOD ON KEY ISSUES AND HOW WE MIGHT CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS. MOST POSITIVE RESULT OF DISCUSSION WAS MOROKHOV'S AGREEMENT THAT POLITICAL ADVISERS COULD MEET TO HEAR ANY FURTHER IDEAS OF SOV DEL ON ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO DURATION, AS WELL AS TO DISCUSS PROBLEM OF LINKAGE OF THE WEAPONS BAN TO THE PNE MORATORIUM. MAIN PROBLEM DISCUSSED RELATED TO WHETHER A "SEISMIC EVENT" SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR REQUESTING AN ON-SITE INSPECTION AND WHAT KIND OF EVIDENCE COULD BE PRESENTED. MOROKHOV INDICATED, WITHOUT SPECIFYING THEM, GROWING DIFFICULTIES OF SOV DEL WITH U.S. PROPOSALS FOR INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS. HIGHLIGHTS OF DISCUSSION FOLLOW.

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END SUMMARY.

2. ON POSITIVE SIDE, MOROKHOV SAW COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON MANY POINTS REGARDING LANGUAGE FOR INITIATING OSIS (BUT NOT ON "SEISMIC EVENT" PROBLEM, SEE DISCUSSION BELOW) AND HE BELIEVED JOINT TEXT COULD BE WORKED OUT FOR TREATY ANNEX ON INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE.

3. MOROKHOV AGREED TOWARDS END OF MEETING THAT INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS COULD BEGIN AMONG POLITICAL ADVISERS ON ALTERNATIVES TO SOVIET IDEAS ON DURATION AND ON PROBLEM OF LINKAGE BETWEEN THE WEAPONS BAN AND THE PNE MORATORIUM. MOROKHOV BEGAN DISCUSSION BY CITING EARLIER STATEMENTS FROM SOVIET SPEECHES. ON DURATION, HE RECALLED SOV DEL WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO DURATION PROBLEM, PROVIDING THESE WERE BASED ON PRINCIPLE OF UNANIMITY OF ACTION BY PARTICIPATING NUCLEAR POWERS BOTH IN ENTERING INTO AND TERMINATING THEIR OBLIGATIONS, AND ASSUMING OTHER MAJOR ISSUES WERE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED. ON PNE LINKAGE, HE RECALLED SOV DEL'S RECOGNITION OF "COMPLEXITY OF SITUATION" IF WEAPONS BAN WERE TO CONTINUE BUT NOT PNE MORATORIUM, AND ALSO SOV DEL'S DECLARATION OF READINESS TO WORK ON THIS PROBLEM IN GOOD FAITH WITH ITS NEGOTIATING PARTNERS. HE CLAIMED, HOWEVER, THAT U.S. AND UK DELS HAD NOT RESPONDED SPECIFICALLY TO THESE STATEMENTS. WARNKE AND EDMONDS BOTH SAID THAT THEY WERE WILLING AT ANY TIME TO LISTEN TO SOV DEL'S IDEAS, INCLUDING WHAT SOV DEL MEANS BY "PRINCIPLE OF UNANIMITY" FOR DURATION, AND ALSO REGARDING "THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION" ON PNE LINKAGE. WHEN EDMONDS SUGGESTED AT END OF THE MEETING THAT POLITICAL ADVISERS SHOULD BEGIN THIS DISCUSSION, MOROKHOV AGREED.

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4. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, MOROKHOV SAID THAT SOV DEL'S APPREHENSIONS RE U.S. PURPOSES ON INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS (ISIS) ARE NOW TRANSFORMING THEMSELVES INTO "SERIOUS OBJECTIDNS". HE RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT US EXPERTS WERE ATTEMPTING TO INTRODUCE SOME CLARITY BY PRESENTING PAPERS IN THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP. MOROKHOV SAID HE INTENDED TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT AT A PLENARY MEETING THIS FRIDAY. WARNKE COMMENTED THAT ISIS WERE "AN INTEGRAL AND BASIC PART" OF OUR VERIFICATION PROPOSALS. WE WOULD TRY TO PUT TO REST ANY SPECIFIC CONCERNS REGARDING IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY OR SOVEREIGNTY, BUT A GENERALIZED CONCERN OVER THIS PROBLEM SHOULD NOT BLOCK AGREEMENT. HE THOUGHT WE COULD SOLVETHE PROBLEM IF THERE WAS "REASONABLE RECEPTIVITY TO REASONABLE EXPLANATIONS ABOUTREASONABLE PROPOSALS".

5. ON OSI RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS, MOROKHOV RECALLED SOVIET WITHDRAWAL OF ITS PROPOSAL TO HAVE HOST COUNTRY DETERMINE ALL RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS ON AN AD HOC BASIS. BUT HE BELIEVED THAT US SPECIALISTS WERE NOT NOW PROVIDING APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THEIR MANY PROPOSALS. MOROKHOV SAID HE INTENDS TO SPEAK ON THIS SUBJECT ALSO

AT THE FRIDAY PLENARY MEETING.

6. MOST OF THE MEETING WAS ABSORBED IN LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF SOVIET BELIEF THAT AN AMBIGUOUS "SEISMIC EVENT" SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR LAUNCHING AN ON-SITE INSPECTION. MOROKHOV ARGUED THAT SUCH A FORMULA WOULD NOT PRECLUDE SUBMITTING ANY OTHER SUPPLEMENTARY DATA. US PROPOSAL THAT ANY AMBIGUOUS EVENT COULD BE THE BASIS OF AN OSI WOULD OPEN UP POSSIBILITY OF ARBITRARINESS IN MAKING REQUEST. SOV DEL WANTS CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT MAY, AND MAY NOT

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BE, THE BASIS FOR REQUESTING AN OSI. FOR THE MULTILATERAL TREATY, WITH ANTICIPATED WIDE ADHERENCE, IT WOULD BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO BE CLEAR IN KNOWING BASIS FOR REQUESTING OSIS.

7. IN RESPONDING TO MOROKHOV'S GENERAL POINTS ON VERIFICATION, WARNKE STRESSED THAT US DECISION TO ACCEPT VOLUNTARINESS AS BASIS FOR OSIS HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT. THIS WAS ONLY POSSIBLE IF THERE WOULD BE GOOD PROCEDURES FOR LAUNCHING AN OSI AND ISIS PROVIDED GOOD AUTHENTICATED DATA--AND NOT JUST AS A SUPPLEMENT BUT AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE TREATY.

8. ON THE BASIS FOR REQUESTING OSIS, WARNKE EXPLAINED AT LENGTH THAT SEISMIC EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED IN EVERY CASE. IF THERE WERE CASES WHERE WE HAD SERIOUS SUSPICIONS OF A VIOLATION, AND GOOD EVIDENCE, BUT NO

SEISMIC EVIDENCE, IT WAS NOT REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT WE WOULD REMAIN SILENT. NOR WOULD WE EXPECT THE SOVIET SIDE TO SAY THAT WE COULD NOT SEEK CLARIFICATION, AND
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POSSIBLY AN OSI, JUST BECAUSE WE DID NOT HAVE SEISMIC EVIDENCE TO PRESENT. WHAT WE WERE INTERESTED IN WAS CLARIFYING SITUATIONS WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE A VIOLATION OF THE TREATY; I.E., AN UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. THAT WAS QUITE SPECIFIC. IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES THAT, WHENEVER THERE WERE SERIOUS SUSPICIONS OF A TREATY VIOLATION, THESE COULD BE ALLAYED, WHATEVER THE EVIDENCE. IT WOULD BE CLEAR AT THE TIME OF THE REQUEST WHETHER THERE WAS SERIOUS GROUND FOR CONCERN, BUT WE SHOULD NOT TRY NOW TO SPECIFY REQUIREMENTS ABOUT EVIDENCE IN THE FUTURE.

9. MOROKHOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDEA OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS WAS A MAJOR STEP ON ITS PART WHICH AFFECTED ITS SOVEREIGNTY. HE THOUGHT THAT REQUESTING AN OSI WOULD BE LIKE MAKING AN INDICTMENT AND IT WOULD BE INADMISSABLE TO DO SO ON THE BASIS OF VAGUE CONCERNS. WARNKE INTERJECTED THAT AN OSI WOULD NOT BE AN INDICTMENT BUT RATHER AN INVESTIGATION AND WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO REQUEST SUCH AN INVESTIGATION IF THERE WAS A REASONABLE CAUSE.

10. MOROKHOV SAID THAT HE WAS APPEALING TO US TO DEFINE AN AMBIGUOUS EVENT. THE SOVIETS WERE NOT RELUCTANT ABOUT OSIS, THEY JUST WANTED US TO BE CLEAR. THEY WANT TO KNOW THE TYPE OF CRITERIA THAT MAY LEAD TO AN OSI AND THEY ARE NOT ASKING TO WRITE THESE CRITERIA INTO THE TREATY--JUST TO UNDERSTAND. HIS GOVERNMENT GAVE HIM PERMISSION TO SAY THAT "SEISMIC EVENTS" COULD BE THE BASIS FOR OSIS. IF WE THOUGHT THAT SOMETHING ELSE SHOULD BE THE BASIS, LIKE AN AMBIGUOUS EVENT, WE SHOULD BE FORTHCOMING IN EXPLAINING THIS.

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11. CONVERSATION CONTINUED WITH WARNKE EXPLAINING SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE NATURE OF THE EVENT SUBJECT TO AN OSI WAS A POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE TREATY AND THAT THE CONCERNED COUNTRY SHOULD BE ABLE TO PRESENT ANY SERIOUS BASIS FOR ITS CONCERN AS EVIDENCE. MOROKHOV REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT WE NEEDED TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN MAKING CLEAR

WHAT WOULD BE THE BASIS FOR AN OSI. THE CONVERSATION ENDED WITH ALL THREE REPRESENTATIVES SUGGESTING THAT THE DIFFERENCES IN VIEW MIGHT NOT BE SO GREAT AND THAT A GREATER DEGREE OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING OUGHT TO BE POSSIBLE.

12. ALL THREE REPRESENTATIVES AGREED THAT THE WORKING GROUPS SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE AS MUCH PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE ON ALL SUBJECTS, PARTICULARLY WHERE THERE WAS A LARGE AREA OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING, AS IN THE CASE OF THE GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA. WARNKE

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